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Abstract. Using an exploratory research perspective, we examine how multinational firms’ 
executives’ motivations map into corporate website performance disclosure. Our focus is on 
managements’ beliefs about the relevance of financial, social and environmental performance 
disclosures and how these beliefs relate to the firm’s website disclosure practices. For 56 
companies, we use managers’ perceptions along with data captured from websites. Employing 
factor and regression analysis, we find that executives’ perceptions of stakeholders’ importance 
affect their firms’ web-based disclosure practices and foci. Additionally, strategic focus, media, 
size of organization, profitability, leverage and analyst following are found influential in explaining 
types of performance disclosures made.
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. INTRODUCTION
The effects of organizations’ voluntary disclosure decisions within society 
have been studied using legitimacy theory (e.g., Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Buhr, 
1998; Wilmhurst and Frost, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001) and stakeholder 
theory (e.g., Roberts, 1992; Henriques and Sardosky, 1999; Ruf et al., 2001). 
Recently, these two theories have been used jointly to explore managers’ stakeholder 
perceptions and how these perceptions relate to the legitimacy of those managers’ 
organizations (e.g., Cormier et al., 2004).
Studies examining the legitimacy and stakeholder views have employed a 
variety of research methods. The range in methods spans case-based research 
(e.g., Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Buhr, 1998; Cormier and Gordon, 2001) to large 
sample size and quantitative research methods (e.g., Ruf et al., 2001; Neu et al., 
1998; Richardson and Welker, 2001). This scope in research methods parallels the 
rapid evolution over the past decade in the means used to reach stakeholders and 
to communicate legitimacy. This evolution has moved from primarily paper-based 
to web-based communications (Louwers et al., 1996; Wildstrom, 1997; Ashbaugh 
et al., 1999), leading to predictions that certain paper-based communications (e.g. 
corporate annual reports) will cease to exist (Staff Reports, 1999).
While many reasons have been offered for companies’ voluntary information 
disclosures (e.g., reduction of disclosure costs) (Atiase, 1985; Lang and Lundholm, 
1993: Milgrom, 1981; Roberts, 1992) or information asymmetry (Gibbins et 
al., 1990; Clarkson et al., 1994; Frankel et al., 1999), most of these reasons are 
primarily related to financial stakeholders. To more broadly explore the reasons 
behind managers’ performance disclosure practices as reflected through corporate 
websites, we propose a model of the relationships among website disclosures, 
perceived stakeholder interests, firm-specific and contextual variables. We then 
explicitly examine how well our model portrays the disclosure-stakeholder 
relationships. We employ several types of data in our study. We first gathered 
perceptual data from a sample of executives of large international corporations. 
We next collected and content coded data from the executives’ corporate websites. 
Additionally, we gathered data informative of the sample companies’ financial 
setting and information environment. We use statistical analyses of these data to 
explore how managers’ perceptions of stakeholder concerns affect web disclosure 
in a strategic communication context.
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Our model adds to the literature by examining web-based communications 
and managers’ perceptions of the interests of stakeholders with respect to these 
communications. In particular we focus on managements’ beliefs about the 
relevance of financial, social and environmental performance disclosures and how 
these beliefs relate to the firm’s actual website disclosure practices.
Our paper is organized in four sections. First, we review relevant literature. 
Second, we provide our model and a description of the sample data used to 
empirically illustrate the model. Third, we describe the results of our analysis of this 
data and discuss our findings. In our final section we outline our study’s limitations 
and conclusions as well as provide suggestions for future research.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
2.. Stakeholders and performance disclosure
It is often assumed that shareholders are most directly affected by a firm’s 
transparency (or lack thereof) in performance disclosure because of the direct effect 
on their wealth. However, other stakeholders may also have a vested interest in a 
firm’s performance disclosure (Harrison and Freeman, 1999). Evan and Freeman 
(1993) argue that a firm has a stewardship obligation to all stakeholders as they 
are all affected by its strategy. As well, the quality of a firm’s relationships with 
its various stakeholders directly influences the firm’s performance (Ogden and 
Watson, 1999).
Stakeholders are concerned with a firm’s long-term survival as a way to 
preserve the value of their relationships. Hence, stakeholders’ information needs 
reflect dimensions of organizational performance that are close to their interests 
and encompass both financial and non-financial performance measures. Bowen 
et al. (1995) show that a firm’s accounting method choices are affected by the 
extent of its explicit and implicit contractual relationships with stakeholders. 
Cormier et al., (2004), indicate managers consider key stakeholders’ interests and 
concerns when determining their firm’s environmental performance disclosure, a 
non-financial measure.
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While key stakeholder groups may have overlapping interests, the nature of their 
exchanges and relationships with the firm implies they also have specific concerns 
and interests that represent unique informational needs. Voluntary disclosure of 
firm information will be undertaken if doing so is less costly than having investors 
and other financial stakeholders incur information costs themselves (Atiase, 1985; 
Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Milgrom, 1981; Roberts, 1992). Two examples of 
when firms would follow a voluntary disclosure strategy are when expansion plans 
require access to capital markets or when there is a wide following of analysts. 
In these cases voluntary disclosure may reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors and lower financing costs (Gibbins et al., 1990; Clarkson 
et al., 1994; Frankel et al., 1999; Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998). However, before 
a firm can benefit from information disclosure, it must build a reputation among 
stakeholders as a credible discloser (Healy et al., 1999).
Performance disclosure allows stakeholders (e.g., suppliers and customers) 
to assess the value of their contractual relationships with a firm. Such value is 
dependent upon critical attributes, e.g. both parties’ going concern status (Bowen et 
al., 1995), as well as honesty and reputation (Karpoff and Lott, 1993). The evidence 
suggests that if a firm lacks transparency in one aspect of its activities, stakeholders 
may infer that other activities or relationships are also tainted or untrustworthy.
Conversely, to legitimize their firm’s activities, managers must be able to assess 
and react to public pressures, including the nature and scope of public comments 
about the firm’s activities. One outlet used to gauge public sentiment is the media 
where increased attention may lead to increased community concern (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998). Ader (1995) has provided evidence that the extent of attention paid 
by the media to pollution issues increases community concerns over such issues. 
This suggests that media attention, e.g., through press coverage, directly underlies 
public pressures managers may perceive regarding their firm’s activities. In an 
effort to legitimize their actions, it is expected managers will react to increased 
pressures by increasing the extent of their performance disclosure. In this respect, 
the Internet can constitute a useful tool.
2.2. Web-based disclosures
Web-based disclosures have been examined in a variety of recent studies and 
different contexts where communication has been a primary emphasis. Examples 
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of the diversity of these studies include comparisons of web-based and print-based 
advertising (Gallagher et al., 2001a; Gallagher et al., 2001b), website features used in 
marketing communications (Perry and Bodkin, 2002), and use of websites by activist 
organizations to communicate with stakeholders (Kent et al., 2001; 2003).
More directly related to our study is research that examines financial and 
corporate social disclosures made by corporations on their websites. Ashbaugh 
et al. (1999) using a sample of 253 corporate websites found that for financial 
disclosures there was a trade-off between the usefulness of web-based information 
and its reliability. Bodkin and Perry (2004, p. 19), using a sample of 152 Fortune 500 
retailers’ websites, found the more profitable companies were “more likely to use 
company specific, shareholder, web specific and customer service elements.”
Using a sample of 100 Fortune 500 companies, Esrock and Leichty (1998) 
found that a majority of these websites had some social and environmental 
disclosures with environmental and technology oriented firms’ websites containing 
more of these disclosures than companies from the wholesale-retail and finance 
industries. Esrock and Leichty examined which communications were aimed toward 
specific stakeholders in their 1999 and 2000 studies. In these papers, the web-based 
communications were used to reach financial community members, news services 
and customers but generally not used to reach other stakeholders.
From the cited web-based studies, stakeholders provide a reason for why these 
disclosures are supplied by companies. Freeman (1984) defined stakeholders as 
“any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization’s objectives” (p. 46). To achieve legitimacy entities must reach these 
stakeholders.
2.3. Managers’ perceptions of stakeholders
Directly related to stakeholder communication is how managers perceive the 
importance of various stakeholder groups. Managers’ attitudes towards perceptions 
of stakeholders have been examined from several perspectives. Positive relationships 
have been found between CEO attitudes and the community (Lerner and Fryxell, 
1994) and between the salience of stakeholders, CEO values and corporate social 
performance (Agle et al., 1999). In environmental disclosure contexts, Henriques 
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and Sadorsky (1999) found that the relative importance of stakeholders differs 
depending on the environmental profile of a company while Harvey and Schaefer 
(2001) found institutional stakeholders were the most important for water and 
electrical utility companies.
While neither Lerner and Fryxell (1994) nor Agle et al. (1999) provided 
a model, Cormier et al.’s (2004) focus was on executives’ perceptions of 
stakeholders with respect to environmental disclosures. Their model outlined the 
relationship between executives’ perceptions of six stakeholder groups’ interests, 
the executives’ assessment of their corporations’ concerns and the types of 
environmental disclosures made. They found evidence supporting their model that 
for environmental disclosures, the decision to disclose and the resulting disclosures 
were related to environmental managers’ attitudes towards stakeholder groups.
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.. Model of corporate web-based reporting
Building on previous research, we provide a model of corporate web-
based reporting in Figure 1. The first box contains general types of information 
corporate executives have available to them for possible disclosure. Disclosure of 
this information on corporate websites depends on whether managers think the 
information is important to one or several stakeholder groups or because specific 
stakeholder groups such as regulators and governments require its disclosure. The 
second box indicates the eight potential stakeholders used in previous research (e.g., 
Woodward et al., 1996; Agle et al., 1999; Harvey and Schaefer, 2001) or suggested 
as being important to companies (Leighton and Thain, 1997; Lev, 1992). These 
stakeholders are: investors, lenders, employees, suppliers, customers, governments, 
regulators and the public. In our model, the key is not just that these stakeholders are 
important but they are thought to be important by managers. Thus the second box 
represents managers’ perceptions and is the lens through which potential disclosures 
are viewed. Furthermore, the financial condition and contextual environment of 
the reporting corporation may affect disclosures. These variables, used to capture 
the corporation’s financial condition and context, are shown in the third and fourth 
boxes in Figure 1. By combining and using contextual and perceptual data, we 
165Aerts, Cormier, Gordon & Magnan            Performance Disclosure on the Web: an Exploration...   
examine if and how the perceptual data can add to the explanatory factors contained 
in the contextual variables.
Media exposure is modelled as a direct effect on performance disclosure. 
The influence of the media derives from the information conveyed about firms 
(Henriques and Sadorsky, 1999). A firm’s failure to operate in a manner consistent 
with community, or public, expectations, may lead to its demise (Deegan and 
Rankin, 1996; Neu et al., 1998). In general, media exposure proxies for both 
public pressure and a general demand for information, implying the existence of a 
direct relationship between media exposure and the level of web-based disclosure. 
However, this “direct” relationship leaves abstract the motivations for impression 
management of web disclosure strategies. This relationship is shown in the fifth 
box in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A Model of Corporate Web-based Reporting
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3.2. Description of sample data
Our data were gathered in a multi-stage process for a sample of large North 
American and European corporations. The first stage was the development and 
pre-testing of a questionnaire concerned with identifying the primary stakeholders 
for a variety of disclosures made by companies on their websites.
In lieu of structured interviews and to obtain the desired combined North 
American/European sample, a questionnaire was employed to gather both subjective 
and objective data. The questionnaire contained 30 stakeholder-related questions 
representing seven broad categories of information. Using a scale of 0 (not aimed 
at this group) to 5 (primarily aimed at this group), executives were asked to 
indicate their perceptions of the importance of particular web-based disclosures 
to eight stakeholder groups. A 31st question asked respondents to rate on a 0 (total 
disagreement) to 5 (total agreement) scale five strategic postures with respect 
to their firms. Additional data including demographic information, hierarchical 
structure, and information regarding website monitoring were also collected. 
Altogether, the questionnaire took about 20 minutes to complete.
Once the questionnaire was pre-tested, it was sent to a group of 866 multinational 
firms. The initial population of North American and Continental European firms was 
previously analysed in 2002 (Aerts et al., 2004). The European countries and firms 
selected for study were chosen because the authors had expertise in the relevant 
languages, French, English, Dutch and German, but not other European languages. 
After two mailings of the questionnaire as well as the mailing of an electronic 
questionnaire (web), 56 firms responded (a 6.5% response rate, see Table 1). Only 
one manager responded per firm in the sample and no firms are double counted. The 
titles of responding individuals included CEO, Vice President Strategic Planning, 
Vice President Web Development, Head Corporate Relations, Public Affairs 
Specialist and Corporate Communication Officer. As a test of how well our data 
represent the sample population, we observe a median analyst following of 12 for 
the sample population compared to 11.5 for our responding firms.
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U.S Canada France Germany Benelux Total
S&P 500 S&PTSX 300 SBF120
DAX70/
DAX30
E u r o n e x t 
B r u s s e l s - 5 0 
biggest market 
capitalization,
AEX/MIDKAP
Non financial firms 420 213 95 85 84 897
Mergers/delisting 12 19 - - -
Questionnaires sent 408 194 95 85 84 866
Responses 9 26 6 5 10 56
Response rate 2.2% 13.4% 6.3% 5.9% 8.4% 6.5%
Response rate among 
firms followed by at 
least 5 analysts
2.0% 21.0% 6.9% 8.2% 14.3% 10.4%
Table 1. Sample description
3.3. Description of variables
Our model is tested using subjective and objective variables such as financial 
measures, environmental descriptors and managerial perceptions.
3.3.1. Measurement of performance disclosure
Performance measurement practices and research have defined and developed 
a variety of performance indicators (e.g., Standard & Poors, 2002 for financial 
and governance disclosure; Pirchegger and Wagenhofer, 1999, and Marston and 
Polei, 2004, for investors, governance and social responsibility disclosures; Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996, Ittner and Larcker, 1998, and Robb et al., 2001, for indicators 
of operations’ efficiency, as well as measures of value for the client, innovation, 
development and growth). We measure performance disclosure using a coding 
instrument in a manner similar to Wiseman (1982) and Cormier and Magnan (1999; 
2003). The grid we used comprises 101 items. The performance disclosure items 
are grouped into seven categories: Financial performance, corporate governance, 
customer value, human and intellectual capital, production efficiency, innovation, 
development and growth, and social responsibility (see Appendix 1). The rating 
is based on a score of one to three, where “three” describes items expressed in 
monetary or quantitative terms, “two” indicates items specifically described and 
“one” designates items discussed in general. The 56-firm sample had been coded 
for a separate study in 2002 (Aerts et al., 2004) with the coding procedure replicated 
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in 2004. This content coding involved independent coders and where discrepancies 
occurred, these were resolved by a third party.
Overall, the coding process provides a reliable performance disclosure measure. 
Internal consistency estimates (Cronbach’s alpha on score components) show the 
variance is quite systematic since alpha varies from 0.86 to 0.96 by components (see 
Table 3). For the total index, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.74. Cronbach’s alpha estimates 
the proportion of variance in the test scores that can be attributed to true score 
variance. It can range from 0 (if no variance is consistent) to 1.00 (if all variance 
is consistent). According to Nunnally (1978), a score of 0.70 is acceptable.
3.3.2. Firms’ financial condition
Three variables are used to capture the firms’ financial condition that can affect 
performance disclosure:
Firm Size. Prior evidence is consistent in highlighting a positive relationship 
between the extent of corporate disclosure and firm size (Scott, 1994; Cormier and 
Magnan, 1999; Neu et al., 1998, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Debreceny et al., 2002; 
Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Firm size, measured as 
ln (Assets), is introduced as a contextual variable that is positively related to the 
extent of performance disclosure. 
Profitability. Many studies document a positive association between a firm’s 
disclosure and its financial performance (Mills and Gardner, 1984; Cochran and 
Wood, 1984; McGuire et al., 1988; Cormier and Magnan, 1999, 2003; Cormier et al., 
2004). For this study profitability is measured as the return on assets and a positive 
relationship is expected between profitability and performance disclosure.
Leverage. In this study, we define leverage as Long-term debt/Equity. In prior 
research (Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Cormier and Gordon, 2001), leverage has 
been found to have a negative relationship with performance disclosures. Reaction 
to performance disclosures might generally be expected to be positive. However, 
for firms in poor financial condition such disclosures may emphasize the firms’ 
poor performance overwhelming the potentially positive benefits of increased 
disclosures.
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3.3.3. Contextual variables
Analyst following. A firm’s analyst following is used as a proxy for the level of 
other disclosures and the extent of a firm’s communication with financial analysts 
(Leuz, 2003). We expect a positive relationship between analyst following and 
performance disclosures.
Media exposure. Performance disclosure also can be perceived as a response 
to pressures exerted by various stakeholders or constituencies, with corporate 
managers attempting to manage public impressions with respect to performance. 
In this study, a firm’s media exposure is computed by taking the number of articles 
in the year 2003, as contained in the ABI Disclosure database. We expect a positive 
relationship between media exposure and performance disclosure. In addition as 
a form of sensitivity analysis, we test whether the relationship is direct or if it is 
moderated by the perceived stakeholder importance.
Industry membership. Sample firms are grouped according to the S&P 500 
classification (eight industries). Dummy variables are used to control for industry 
effects. 
Corporate strategic focus. An organization’s strategic posture addresses a set of 
elements that describe how the organization has aligned its resources in response to 
its internal and external environments to accomplish its goals and objectives (Porter, 
1991). Highlighted in our model is the relationship seen by executives between 
potential stakeholders and the corporate strategic focus. Although other potential 
variables may have an influence, it is this relationship between stakeholders and 
strategic focus that results in the types of disclosure actually made on the corporate 
websites.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our sample of 56 North American and European multinational firms is drawn 
from seven broadly defined industries (S&P classification): Consumer goods and 
services (13 firms), Materials (resources) (16 firms), Energy (3 firms), Industrials (5 
firms), Chemicals and Drugs (4 firms), Utilities (5 firms), Information technology 
(4 firms) and Telecom and Media (6 firms).
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for firm size (Total Assets in millions of 
Euros), profitability (ROA), leverage (total debt/total assets), analyst following, 
media exposure and corporate strategic focus. With the exception of corporate 
strategic focus, these variables were gathered from the company web sites or 
from publicly available sources. The sample firms may be characterized as large 
(mean asset size: 10,715 million Euros), profitable (mean ROA: .0004), with a 
low debt-to-equity ratio (mean: 0.62). These companies receive much attention 
by both analysts (mean analyst following: 12.98) and the media (mean number of 
articles: 11.86). Additionally, the strategic focus of these companies tends to be 
one of cost efficiency while emphasizing having different products (or services) 
necessary to cater to different customers.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Total assets in million Euros 26.7 176 596 10 715 28 726
Profitability (ROA) -0.45 0.11 0.004 0.08
Leverage (total debt/total assets) 0.11 1.29 0.62 0.20
Analyst following 0* 45 12.98 10.12
Media exposure 0 122 11.86 23.15
Corporate strategic focus (0 to 5 scale)
Cost efficiency 3 5 4.64 0.58
Different types products/clients 0 5 3.48 1.70
N: 56
*Only one firm has no analyst following (Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, a cooperative).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
As noted, our questionnaire asked respondents to address 30 statements. The 
number of statements was relatively large in order to accommodate the inclusion 
of a diverse group of industry classifications. However, for purposes of analysis 
the questions have been collapsed into seven categories. These broadly defined 
categories are labeled as Financial Performance, Corporate Governance, Value 
for Clients, Human/Intellectual Capital, Production Efficiency, Innovation/
Development and Growth, and Social Responsibility. The disclosure score that 
appears after each web-based disclosure was calculated by using the performance 
content coding. These categories as well as the number of questionnaire items 
included in each category are provided in Table 3.
171Aerts, Cormier, Gordon & Magnan            Performance Disclosure on the Web: an Exploration...   
Web-based 
Disclosure 
score
Number 
of 
items per 
category 
Internal 
consistency 
estimate
Cronbach alpha 
(0.74)
Shareholders Lenders/Creditors Customers Government Suppliers Employees Regulators Public
Financial 
performance
11.25
2 0.86 3.774.71
2.88
4.19
1.55
2.77
0.94
2.02
1.52
2.85
2.05
3.00
1.39
2.97
1.57
2.77
Corporate 
Governance
20.54 
5 0.89 3.384.57
2.00
3.62
1.46
2.73
1.04
2.63
1.01
2.45
1.82
3.14
1.90
3.50
1.74
2.92
Value for clients
13.95 5 0.94
1.51
3.15
0.98
2.55
2.21
4.37
0.73
2.45
1.30
2.96
1.45
3.03
0.77
2.46
1.35
3.06
Human / 
Intellectual 
Capital
9.64 
3 0.93 1.023.05
0.58
2.50
0.84
2.97
0.56
2.67
0.52
2.26
1.53
3.88
0.61
2.77
1.18
3.25
Production 
Efficiency
5.23 
4 0.95 1.633.98
1.09
3.08
1.27
3.80
0.70
2.77
0.87
2.82
1.24
3.44
0.79
3.02
1.08
3.00
Innovation / 
Development 
and Growth
5.64 
3 0.94 2.434.08
1.50
3.29
2.13
4.00
0.97
2.93
1.39
3.14
1.85
3.53
0.89
2.52
1.63
3.16
Social Respon-
sibility
10.09
7 0.96 1.70 3.31
1.51
3.11
1.62
3.51
1.55
3.50
1.19
2.99
1.65
3.84
1.47
3.39
1.91
3.75
Table 3. Executive assessment of stakeholders’ interests in disclosure on the website
Mean scores / Mean score for non-zero responses (0 to 5 scale)
Two means are provided for each disclosure category. The first line of means 
for each category was calculated by scaling the web-based disclosure scores by the 
number of items included in each category. This mean includes all 56 responses 
and as such includes managers who assigned a zero to a stakeholder group as well 
as those who assigned numbers greater than zero. The second line of means is 
calculated dropping managers who did not find the disclosure items to be aimed 
at a particular stakeholder group (zero ratings).
As might be expected, shareholders are found to be important stakeholders for 
most disclosure categories with other stakeholders viewed as important for only 
a few categories. For instance, the sample executives thought the Public was the 
most important stakeholder with respect to social responsibility disclosures but 
the Public was not thought to be very important (compared to shareholders and 
lenders/creditors) in relation to financial performance disclosures.
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To check on the consistency of our results in Table 3, we use Cronbach’s 
alpha to estimate the proportion of the variance in the mean scores that may be 
attributed to the “true” score’s variance. The range of this statistic is from 0.86 to 
0.96 indicating the sample means are quite reliable.
For Table 4 we employ principal components factor analysis with Varimax 
rotation for two reasons. First, this procedure allows us to examine the relationships 
among the performance disclosure variables and second, it allows data reduction 
which is important given our sample size (n = 56 companies). Using a cut-off of 
.50 for inclusion of variables in the factors, we find three factor components that 
cumulatively explain 64 per cent of the overall variance. These three components 
are named Financial oriented disclosure, Clients, and Human capital/Social 
responsibility and are shown in Table 4, Panel A.
In a second factor analysis presented in Panel B of Table 4, we add industry 
dummies since some performance disclosure components are industry-specific. 
Results show four profiles: Financial oriented disclosure, Clients/Technology, 
Innovation/Chemicals and drugs, and Human capital/Social responsibility.
This second factor analysis reveals several findings of interest. First, companies 
essentially publishing financial oriented information are not concentrated in any 
particular industry. Second, firms emphasizing the value of client disclosure are 
concentrated in the technology industry, while chemical and drug firms stress 
innovation disclosure. Finally, there seems to be a separate profile for firms sensitive 
to social/human capital.
Table 5 presents two variations of two OLS regressions. Both panels examine 
the relationship between Total Performance Disclosure with respect to companies’ 
specific characteristics, strategic focus and assessment of stakeholder focus. Also 
each panel contains the results of the regression with, and without, country dummy 
variables. The difference between Panels A and B is the number of disclosure 
components included in the dependent variable. The regression in Panel A includes 
all seven web-based disclosure component scores while Panel B excludes the score 
for Value for Clients due to multicollinearity. Overall, what Table 5 indicates is the 
existence of a significant positive relationship between stakeholder focus and total 
performance disclosures even after we control for the firm specific characteristics 
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(adjusted R-squares 45% and 43.8%, F significance .000 for both regressions). 
We drop further analyses using country dummies because of the weak impact of 
these variables.
Panel A: Firm-specific factors
Variable Component 1Financial oriented disclosure
Component 2
Clients
Component 3
Human capital/Social 
responsibility
Performance disclosure
Financial performance 0.82
Corporate Governance 0.58
Value for clients 0.87
Human / Intellectual Capital 0.88
Production Efficiency 0.63
Innovation / Development and 
Growth 0.61
Social Responsibility 0.65
Eigenvalue
Variance explained
Cumulative variance explained
2.20
31.37%
31.37%
1.24
17.68%
49.05%
1.05
15.0%
64.05%
Panel B: Firm-specific factors with industries
Variable
Component 1
Financial 
oriented 
disclosure
Component 2
Clients/
Technology
Component 3
Innovation/
Chemicals 
And drugs
Component 4
Human 
capital/Social 
responsibility
Performance disclosure
Financial performance 0.83
Corporate Governance 0.66
Value for clients 0.79
Human / Intellectual Capital 0.86
Production Efficiency 0.58
Innovation / Development and Growth 0.68
Social Responsibility 0.62
Industry
Chemicals and Drugs 0.90
Technology 0.82
Eigenvalue
Variance explained
Cumulative variance explained
2.20
24.66%
24.66%
1.61
17.88%
42.54%
1.26
14.02%
56.56%
1.07
11.86%
68.42%
Table 4. Principal components factor analysis Varimax rotated component matrix (correlations > 0.50)
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Panel A: Dependent Variable: Total score of seven disclosure components
With Country dummies Without country dummies
Sign Coefficient P value Coefficient  P value
Intercept -11.76 0.763 9.35 0.806
Firm’s financial condition
Size + 4.57 0.021 5.33 0.007
Profitability + -12.51 0.751 -11.25 0.768
Leverage - -44.01 0.069 -41.72 0.007
Contextual variables 
Analyst following + 0.76 0.054 0.80 0.045
Media exposure + 0.31 0.028 0.34 0.007
Corporate strategic focus
Cost efficiency +/- -2.19 0.726 -8.86 0.154
Different types products/clients +/- -0.24 0.913 -1.40 0.495
Assessment of stakeholder interest 
Perceived  stakeholder importance + 0.05 0.001 0.03 0.011
Country dummies
USA +/- 14.05 0.185
Germany +/- 0.54 0.966
Belgium +/- -5.48 0.621
France +/- -21.67 0.033
Netherlands +/- 21.48 0.087
Adjusted R-square 56.1% 45.0%
F Sign. 0.000 0.000
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Total score of six disclosure components
With Country dummies Without country dummies
Sign Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
Intercept -6.82 0.871 -1.32 0.973
Firm’s financial condition
Size + 3.76 0.045 4.88 0.009
Profitability + -5.99 0.877 -19.26 0.589
Leverage - -39.12 0.004 -32.66 0.012
Contextual variables
Analyst following + 0.66 0.120 0.51 0.068
Media exposure + 0.36 0.009 0.34 0.003
Corporate strategic focus
Cost efficiency +/- -3.09 0.551 -8.64 0.079
Different types products/clients +/- -1.91 0.346 -2.59 0.172
Assessment of stakeholder interest 
Shareholders + 0.22 0.054 0.20 0.068
Government + 0.25 0.064 0.19 0.092
Country dummies
USA +/- 2.06 0.825
Germany +/- 7.64 0.521
Belgium +/- -6.26 0.571
France +/- -14.57 0.142
Netherlands +/- 22.36 0.051
Adjusted R-square 51.4% 43.8%
F Sign. 0.000 0.000
Table 5. OLS Regressions on the Determinants of Web-Based Performance Disclosure
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Sensitivity analyses were used to examine the Table 5 results. To check 
whether there is some consistency in web-based performance disclosure between 
time periods, Performance disclosure was lagged. No significant relationship 
between disclosures over time was found. A dummy variable for “continent” 
was included to check for differences between North American and Continental 
European disclosures but was not significant. The total stakeholder focus variable 
was dropped and replaced with the ratio of focus on financial stakeholders 
(shareholders plus creditors) to focus on total stakeholders. Again, this change 
did not produce significant results indicating that disclosure is not driven by any 
one group of stakeholders. This finding is consistent with the high correlations 
found between each stakeholder group. Additionally, utilities (5 observations) 
were dropped from the regression to ensure these highly regulated firms were 
not influencing the findings. The results did not change significantly. While 
most of the variables’ signs are as predicted, there is one notable exception. The 
expectation was that profitability would be positively related to total performance 
disclosure but the coefficient is negative in both Panels A and B. However, in these 
regressions, profitability was not significant (F statistics p value < 0.768; and p 
value < 0.589).
While Table 5 provides an examination of a company’s total disclosure 
strategy, it is unlikely that all stakeholder groups have an interest or an effect on 
all components of corporate disclosure. Hence, we also analyze the determinants 
of the different components of corporate disclosure. To obtain a parsimonious set 
of regression analyses, we first perform correlation analyses between variables that 
proxy for the interests of specific stakeholder groups and performance disclosure 
components. For each disclosure component regression, we only retain as 
independent variables those stakeholders’ interests that are significantly correlated 
(p < 0.10). Table 6 provides OLS regression analyses for each of the seven disclosure 
categories. These regressions provide a method of examining the relationship 
between the categories (dependent variable), the firm specific characteristics, the 
corporate strategic focus and managers’ assessment of the stakeholders’ interests. 
With three exceptions, all of the independent variables are expected to have a 
positive relationship with the dependent variables. The exceptions are leverage, 
cost efficiency and different types of products/clients. Leverage is expected to have 
a negative relationship with the disclosure categories. This is because the more 
debt a company owes, the more likely it is to meet only the minimum disclosure 
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requirements. With respect to the two strategic corporate variables, the relationship 
with the seven disclosure categories may be either positive or negative depending 
on the category. For example, we expect that Cost efficiency will be positively 
related to Production efficiency. However, Cost efficiency is more likely to be 
negatively related to Social Responsibility.
Pre-
dicted 
sign
Financial 
perfor-
mance
Corpora-
te Go-
vernance
Human / 
Intellectual 
Capital
Produc-
tion Effi-
ciency
Innovation / 
Development 
and Growth
Social Res-
ponsibility
Intercept 2.14 -8.77 -6.91 *-14.92 -0.96 -4.01
Firm’s financial condition
Size + 0.61 *1.54 ***1.48 **0.85 0.42 *0.57
Profitability + **35.09 -1.94 -4.98 -13.98 -8.58 **11.08
Leverage - -2.48 -1.26 ***-9.98 -0.34 ***-8.97 -0.97
Contextual variables
Analyst following + -0.20 0.16 **0.18 -0.01 **0.12 0.05
Media exposure + ***0.11 *0.07 *0.05 ***0.06 *0.04 *0.03
Corporate 
strategic focus
Cost efficiency +/- *-3.16 -2.46 **-2.35 1.18 0.18 -1.16
Different types products/
clients +/- ***1.80 *-1.52 -0.21 ***-1.45 -0.37 -0.25
Assessment of 
stakeholder interest 
Shareholders + **1.24 **0.42 - -0.18 0.01 ***1.32
Lenders/Creditors + -0.38 0.12 - - - ***-1.22
Customers + - - - - -0.07 -0.03
Government + - *0.51 - - **0.32 -0.06
Suppliers + - -0.15 - - -0.04 0.04
Employees + - -0.32 - - **0.37 *-0.27
Regulators + - 0.36 - 0.20 - ***0.33
Public + - *0.32 - *0.42 -0.07 ***0.47
Adjusted R-square 22.2% 35.2% 32.8% 33.9% 36.0% 78.0%
F Sign. 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000
+The regression for the second factor (value for clients) is not significant at conventional levels.
Table 6. OLS Regressions+ on the Determinants of Web-Based Performance Disclosure
The disclosures concerned with Financial Performance are significantly 
related to the company’s profitability (p value < 0.05), media exposure (p value < 
0.01), cost efficiency (p value < 0.10), different types of products/clients (p value 
< 0.01), and shareholders (p value < 0.05). The interpretation of this finding is 
that shareholders are the only group management sees as important when making 
Financial Performance disclosures although this type of disclosure is moderated 
by the company’s strategic focus, its profitability and media exposure.
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Corporate Governance disclosures are primarily aimed at shareholders (p value 
<0.05) and to a lesser extent at the government and public (p values < 0.10). These 
disclosures are positively related to the company’s size (p values < 0.10), media 
exposure (p values < 0.10) and negatively related to the company’s strategic focus 
of providing different products for different clients (p values < 0.10).
Human and Intellectual Capital disclosures are unrelated to stakeholder 
concerns. Instead, this variable is significantly related only to the firm’s specific 
characteristics and the cost efficiency strategic focus.
Production Efficiency is significantly related to company size, media exposure 
and the strategic focus of provision of different types of products for different 
clients. This latter variable is negatively related because it is more difficult to 
attain production efficiency when a company is supplying a variety of products 
to a variety of customers. Interestingly, the only stakeholder group found to be 
weakly significant was the public (p value < 0.10).
Innovation/Development and Growth is significantly related to two stakeholder 
groups, government and employees (both with p value < 0.05). One financial 
variable, leverage (p value < 0.01), and two other variables, analyst following (p 
value < 0.05) and media exposure (p value < 0.10), also are related to Innovation/
Development and Growth.
Stakeholder concerns are found to be more related to Social Responsibility 
disclosures than the other five disclosures examined in Table 6. Five stakeholder 
groups are significantly related to Social Responsibility disclosures with four of 
these (shareholders, lenders/creditors, regulators and the public) at the p value 
< 0.01. Additionally, three other variables are related to these disclosures (size, 
profitability and media exposure).
Finally, to test whether there is a moderating effect between managers’ 
perceived stakeholder importance and media exposure, we add an interaction term 
in two separate regressions based on the component disclosure factors identified 
in our factor analysis (Table 4, Panel A). Results presented in Table 7 suggest that 
media exposure has a moderating effect on the impact of perceived stakeholder 
importance in the decision to disclose Human capital/Social responsibility 
information on websites. The effect of perceived stakeholder importance on this 
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kind of disclosure is significantly strengthened when a firm is subject to higher 
levels of media exposure, suggesting that disclosure policy regarding Human 
capital/Social responsibility information is sensitive to impression management 
concerns induced by public pressures. However, the absence of significant 
interaction between media exposure and perceived importance of stakeholder 
concerns on other types of web-based performance disclosures reinforces the idea 
that the disclosure dimensions revealed by the factor analysis reflect disclosure 
domains driven by different communication logics. The direct effect of stakeholder 
focus on financial-oriented disclosure and the absence of interaction with media 
exposure suggest that this type of information is mainly generic in nature, and is 
not affected by impression management concerns. This finding suggests that when 
a firm is committed to consideration of stakeholder concerns in its web disclosure 
strategy, the primary effect is disclosure that could be seen as more generic in nature 
(e.g., financial oriented disclosure) since most of this information is available from 
other sources. However, the story is different for human capital/social responsibility 
information, which is not driven by a general sensitivity to stakeholder concerns. 
Instead human capital/social responsibility disclosure seems to be more the product 
of impression management that is focused on balancing of disclosure content, and 
the relative perceived power and impact of specific stakeholder groups.
Dependent Variable: Disclosure factors scores 
Predicted sign
Component 1
Financial oriented 
disclosure
Component 3
Human capital/Social 
responsibility
Intercept -1.584 ***-3.047
Firm’s financial condition
Size + 0.097 ***0.313
Profitability + -0.695 -0.742
Leverage - *-0.950 ***-2.185
Contextual variables
Analyst following + 0.001 ***0.041
Media exposure + 0.018 -0.023
Media exposure and Perceived 
stakeholder importance -0.001 **0.001
Perceived stakeholder importance ***0.002 *0.001
Corporate strategic focus
Cost efficiency +/- 0.010 ***-0.192
Different types products/clients +/- -0.010 -0.023
Adjusted R-square 17.0% 61.5%
F Sign. 0.038 0.000
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01. One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise.
Coefficients for industry dummies are not presented.
Table 7. OLS Regressions on the Determinants of Web-Based Performance Disclosure
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5. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH
5.. Discussion
Using our model outlined in Figure 1, our findings provide evidence that the 
eight identified stakeholder groups are thought to be important by executives with 
respect to one or more corporate website disclosures. As shown in Table 3 executives 
indicated they perceived shareholders to be one of the important stakeholder groups 
for all seven types of disclosure, while other stakeholder groups were seen less 
often as disclosure targets. For example, customers were the primary targets of 
only value for client disclosures and suppliers were not the primary targets for 
any of the seven disclosures. This finding is supported by the differential emphasis 
placed on stakeholders in different settings by Henriques and Sadorsky (1999) and 
Harvey and Schaefer (2001).
The findings in Table 3 are tempered somewhat when we include the financial 
and contextual variables. For example from Table 6, shareholders are significant 
stakeholders with respect to financial performance, corporate governance and 
social responsibility disclosures. These stakeholder findings are moderated by the 
fact that in all three cases media exposure is also significant along with at least 
one financial variable (e.g., size and/or profitability). Our model is supported by 
the evidence provided in Table 6 since web-based disclosures are influenced by 
more than executives’ perceptions of the importance of various stakeholders, also 
a finding of Cormier et al. (2004).
Further examination of our results offers interesting insights into the web-
based disclosures of our sample. First, media exposure is found to moderate all 
six types of disclosures we examined in Table 6. Our finding is consistent with 
others’ findings for this variable (e.g., Cormier and Magnan, 2004). What this tells 
us is that a relationship exists between the amount of media attention a company 
receives and the types of disclosures made on its websites. Our finding is supported 
by Ader’s (1995) and Brown and Deegan’s (1998) results that community concerns 
increase as media coverage increases. From a common sense perspective, we note 
that when an individual is being watched, that individual is more likely to do “the 
right (or expected) thing.” This perspective also seems to apply to large corporations 
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where their disclosures are publicly displayed on their websites and they know the 
media is watching them.
Moreover from Table 7, media exposure is seen to have a moderating effect 
on the impact of perceived stakeholder importance in the decision to disclose 
social/human capital information on websites. Stakeholder interest only affects 
this kind of disclosure when a firm is subject to media exposure, suggesting an 
impression management behavior. This finding is not surprising when we refer 
back to the Table 6 Social responsibility disclosure regression. This regression 
indicates that five stakeholder groups significantly affect disclosure and do so in 
opposite directions (e.g. the more leverage, the less disclosure and the more public 
pressures, the more disclosure).
As a proxy for the goal relevance of impression management (Leary and 
Kowalski, 1990), media exposure reinforces the effect of the perception of 
stakeholder importance on specific types of disclosure. Our findings suggest 
that media exposure provides publicity and visibility incentives necessary for 
encouraging human capital and social disclosure but not other more generic types of 
disclosure. These publicity and visibility incentives also hint at the public relations 
character of many human capital/social disclosures made by companies.
Large organizations are more likely to provide information on their websites that 
deal with human/intellectual capital, production efficiency, corporate governance 
and social responsibility. While our evidence is that no one stakeholder group was 
significantly important with respect to the human/intellectual capital disclosures, 
the public was found to be a significant stakeholder for the other three types 
of disclosures with regulators also a significant stakeholder group for social 
responsibility disclosures.
Profitable organizations are most likely to supply information on financial 
performance and social responsibility, a finding echoed in Bodkin and Perry’s 
(2004) results. For financial performance, this fits with the shareholders being seen 
as significant by the executives and in turn, those executives addressing the question 
that most shareholders want answered. With respect to social responsibility, all 
but three stakeholders (customers, government and suppliers) were perceived to 
be important by the responding executives. For shareholders, regulators and the 
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public, social disclosures were positive and significantly related. We interpret this 
to mean that the executives perceived these groups as wanting profitable companies 
to contribute to their communities to maintain their social legitimacy. However, 
for lenders/creditors and employees, their relationship with social disclosures was 
negative. One explanation of this finding is executives think these groups would 
rather see the company maintain its viability and longevity rather than contribute 
to the broader society. Thus the criteria of legitimacy for creditors/lenders and 
employees are preservation of the company and meeting the company’s debt 
payments while safeguarding jobs. If true, legitimacy of a corporate entity to 
lenders/creditors and employees is based on different criteria than legitimacy with 
respect to the shareholders, the public and regulators.
Leverage and analyst following are found to be important explanatory variables 
for two types of disclosures, human/intellectual capital and innovation/development 
and growth. For both types of disclosures, the signs of the coefficients are as 
predicted. With respect to leverage the more debt a company has, the less likely 
it is to make these disclosures. This finding makes sense because a company that 
carries a large amount of debt is less likely to have the funds to put into either its 
human/intellectual capital or into innovative or developmental initiatives. These 
companies would also likely attract a significant analyst following suggesting 
disclosure about human/intellectual capital or innovation/development contains 
more finely grained information components than traditional annual reports.
While we found no stakeholder groups significantly related to the human/
intellectual capital disclosures for our sample, government and employees were 
significant stakeholders with respect to innovation/development and growth. Both 
of these groups are interested in the survival and growth of companies. Without 
innovation and development, the general economy may be at risk providing a 
reason for why executives would perceive government as an important stakeholder 
for these disclosures. Employees want to know whether their jobs will continue 
into the future and information about innovation and growth of their employers 
provides a reason for their interest in these disclosures.
Corporate strategic focus was found as a significant variable for four of the six 
disclosures. Cost efficiency was important with respect to financial performance 
and human/intellectual capital disclosures. In both instances, the relationship 
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with these disclosures is negative. These negative relationships may be due to 
executives seeing a need to preserve competitive advantage in one instance and 
the incompatibility of objectives in the other. If a company provides financial 
performance information along with its strategic focus of cost efficiency, then 
executives may perceive they are providing too much information to competitors. 
With respect to a company that supplies information about its development of 
human and intellectual capital, cost efficiency may be an incompatible goal. Such 
executives may perceive that stakeholders see the strategic goal of cost efficiency 
as incompatible with spending on human/intellectual capital.
The strategic focus of providing different types of products for different clients 
was significantly related to three website disclosures: financial performance, 
corporate governance and production efficiency. Financial performance disclosures 
were positively related to this strategic focus. Here we think that the strategic focus 
on providing what customers need enhances the company’s ability to earn revenues 
and to maintain profitability into the future thus providing important information to 
shareholders. With respect to corporate governance and production efficiency, the 
relationships are negative. In terms of production efficiency disclosures, the more 
varied the types of products and clients, the more it will cost and the longer it will 
take to produce the products. Thus, this negative relationship between efficiency and 
strategic focus makes sense. The negative relationship between this strategic focus 
and corporate governance is somewhat more difficult to explain. The executives in 
this sample may perceive that the more varied the products produced and clients 
served, the more complex is the company. From this perspective, organizational 
complexity may make it more difficult to provide meaningful corporate governance 
disclosures on websites.
One finding from Table 6 is difficult to explain. Neither customers nor suppliers 
were found to be significant stakeholders for the six types of website disclosures. 
Their lack of significance may be due to the perception of the sampled executives 
that there are better ways to communicate to these stakeholders than use of corporate 
websites. Alternatively, it may be due to the limitations of the sample.
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5.2. Conclusion, limitations and future research
In this study, we have explored the relationship between executives’ perceptions 
of stakeholders’ importance and the types of performance related disclosures 
corporations make. Our contributions include our focus on the website disclosures 
made by a sample of executives and their perceptions of the importance of eight 
stakeholder groups. Additionally, we have expanded and advanced the research 
dialogue by incorporating the strategic disclosure focus of the executives with 
financial and contextual variables as well as a broader set of performance disclosures 
beyond environmental disclosures (Cormier et al., 2004).
Our model and sample serve as an illustration that executives’ perceptions 
of stakeholders’ importance affect the types of web-based disclosures made. 
As well, strategic focus, media, size of organization, profitability, leverage and 
analyst following are influential in explaining the types of disclosures supplied by 
companies on their websites. Finally, our illustration indicates that different types 
of disclosures are aimed primarily at different stakeholders.
The primary limitation of our study is our sample size. While international in 
scope, the small sample size does not lend itself to making meaningful international 
comparisons. However, our study is exploratory in nature and its limitations provide 
opportunities to other researchers.
Future research could collect and use a larger sample to verify, add to, or 
question our results. Alternatively, a research method other than questionnaire data 
might be used to examine the same types of questions. One such possible research 
method would be to use content analysis of specific web-based disclosures looking 
for mentions of key stakeholders and identifying the strategic focus inherent in 
these disclosures.
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APPENDIX 
PERFORMANCE DISCLOSURE GRID. CODING SCORES
Liquidity Product description
Indebtedness Quality / up-to-date technology 
Interest coverage Reliability: errors / returns 
Total solvency Price 
Net operating income Delivery time 
Gross margin Awards
ROA or ROE Total product
EPS (diluted) Customer profile / market segment / market share / 
number of customers 
Stock price or stock return Pre-sales support: information / counsel / orders follow-up
EVA After-sales service / insurance 
Total profitability Customer satisfaction / complaints management
Total financial performance Customer loyalty 
Leadership Awards
Mission Total Customers
Strategic planning Service Internet (1 if order, 2 if service, 3 if both)
Risk management  E-business sales 
Globalization E-business productivity [Cost efficiency / speed]
Total strategic management Impact (award, number of users or visitors) 
Competence of managers Total e-business
Managers’ compensation Total customer value
Total managers Hiring / new employees 
Competence Board Qualification / expertise 
Independence Board Training
Compensation (stocks/options) Description of job requirements 1, 2, 3
Other committees Total competence
Total directors Employee empowerment / involvement 
Competence Audit committee Capacity to suggest and to implement changes
Independence Audit committee Teamwork
Relations with external auditors Performance assessment
Relations with internal auditors Performance based compensation 
Total Audit committees Earnings-based compensation 
Ownership structure Carrier opportunities 
Other Award 
Total ownership Fringe benefits
Total corporate governance Total motivation/work climate
Employees satisfaction, survey 
Employee turnover 
Other
Total satisfaction
Total human/intellectual capital
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Investment ($) Purchases of goods and services
Reengineering / downsizing Employment opportunities
Process improvement methods (ex. Kaisen) Job creation]
ISO 9000, total quality management – TQM Equity programs
Others (benchmarking, JIT, etc.) Human capital development 
Total operations rationalization Regional development 
Production cost Gifts and sponsorships 
Production capacity Accidents at work
Waste Health and safety programs 
Inventory / run out rate Product-related-incidents 
Quality of equipment and technology Products in development and environment
Flexibility Product safety 
Process description (1,2,3) Business ethics 
Others Strategic alliances 
Total productivity-cost Community involvement 
Production time Social activities
Unplanned downtime Total social responsibility
Total productivity-speed / cycle time Total performance management 
Partnerships
Acquisitions
Total strategic alliances
Total production efficiency
Sales – new products
Market share – new products
Awards
Total new products
Investments in R&D
Description of products in development
Product testing
Awards
Others - R&D
Total R&D
Increase in sales / market shares
Increase in investments
Total growth
Total innovation, development and growth
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